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OF THE S'l'ATE OF UTAH. 
OCTOBER TERM, 1918. 
F. L. BYRON and CHARLES S. 
AUS'riN, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents. 
vs. 
UTAH COPPER COMPANY, a Cor· 
poration, JOHN KNUDSON and 
GEORGE C. EARL, 
Defendant8 and Appellants. 
rtnd 
STEPHEN HAYS, Impleaded as an 
Additional Defendant. 
No. 3240. 
Appeal from Third Judicial Di8trict Court, Salt Lake 
County, Utah, Ilon. Georqe F. Goodwin,Judqe. 
BRIEF ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS, 
This appeal is upon the judgment roll alone. For 
doubtless good reasons (best known to the appellants), 
no bill of exceptions has been settled. Not a line of evi-
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dence is before the court. Even the opinion of the lower 
court (which counsel has printed in their abstract and 
weave into the argument), was not made part of the rec-
ord by a bill of exceptions and has no place in the 
abstract. 
"Where an appeal is based upon the judgment 
roll alone without a bill of exceptions, we there-
fore have nothing before us except what the stat-
ute provides constitutes a part of the judgment 
roll.'' 
Hulse v. Swicegood, 49 Utah 89. 
We therefore may strike from consideration and 
from the abstract as not part of the record all except: 
(a) The amended complaint. (Abstract 22.) 
(b) The answer of Stephen Hays. (Abstract 30.) 
(c) The findings. (Abstract 54-67.) 
(d) The decree. (Abstract 67-71. 
Of course, as to the appellant and defendant, Utah 
Copper Company, its answer is self-serving and does not 
constitute evidence in its favor. 
It will be observed that the deed in dispute is not in 
the record, nor is the mining lea.se and bond referred to 
in the discussion part of the re.cord. The mere reference 
to Exhibit ''A'' (which purports to be a copy of the min-
ing lease and bond), attached to and made a part of the 
answer, does not prove that this is in fact the mining 
lease and bond under which plaintiffs claim. Of course 
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the answer exhibits and all is deemed denied under the 
statute. 
Bearing all this in mind, we may indulge in the well-
established presumption that the findings were supported 
by sufficient competent (perhaps written) evidence intro-
duced at the trial in the absence of any record to the con-
trary. 
Strange as it may seem, however, an examination of 
the record will show that appellant's statement of facts 
is predicated to a large extent upon the opinion of the 
court (which is not a part of the record), and upon its 
own answer, which hardly proves itself. 
At page 2 of the brief we find reference in the first 
paragraph to pages 32, 39 of the abstract. Page 32 of 
the abstract sets ottt defendant's own answer, and at 
page 39 is found the opinion which is no part of the 
record. 
At page 3 of the brief we find a~ supporting the 
claimed facts a reference to pages 32, 35, 36, 37 and 38 
of the abstract; these pages contain the answer of the 
defendant, Utah Copper Company, and quotations from 
an exhibit attached to and which the Utah Copper Com-
pany apparently claims is a copy and which it desig-
nates as the "mining lease and bond," but there is no-
where in the record any reference which demonstrates 
or tends to establish that this Exhibit "A" attached tn 
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the answer is in fact the mining lease and bond between 
Stephen Hays and F. L. Byron and Charles S. Austin. 
With this wholly unauthorized and presumptions 
assumption (not based upon the record at all) counsel 
proceed to quote from his Exhibit "A" as the lease. 
In other words, counsel build up a case based on their 
own exhibit (which is not admitted by the plaintiffs and 
of which there is no evidence in the record) and daim 
error predicated upon such assumption. 
ARGUMENT. 
I. 
With a situation so umque it is somewhat difficult 
to follow the brief. \V e !decline to be led into an argu-
ment which is wholly academical; and will pursue the 
discussion only far enough to demonstrate that there is 
not a single assignment of error well taken. The only 
question here, of course, is one of law, since the presump-
tion is that the findings are supported by the evidence. 
Hulse v. Swicegood, supra; 
Swanson v. Devine, 49 Utah 5; 
Roberts v. Bertram, 49 Utah 280; 
McGuire v. State Bank, 49 Utah 381. 
It is almost impossible to follow the brief of the ap-
pellant for the reason that so far from complying with 
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Rule 10 there is not in the brief anywhere a reference to 
the assignments of error, or a logical discussion of the 
errors so assigned. The assignments of error as found 
in the abstract do not comply with Rule 26, and in and of 
themselves arc confused and confusing. 
Taking them up, these assignments, in their order: 
Assignment No. 1-This assignment, which is the 
basis of all that follows, attacks. finding No. 11 and com-
plains that the findings is in truth a conclusion of law, 
not supported by the other findings. 
This find~ng No. 11 finds as the ultimate fact: 
"That Stephen Hays is the owner of the ore 
and minerals in and underneath the surface area 
of the property and premises conveyed by him to 
the Defendant Earl, and has not sold or conveyed 
his estate, right, title or interest therein or there-
to, except tmder said lease to the plaintiffs here-
in.'' 
The ultimate fact to be found in this case, of course, 
is whether or not Stephen Hays 'Was the owner of the ore 
and mineral underneath the surface area. The Court 
found this ultimate fact. The finding as an ultimate fact 
is very much the same chara>Cter of finding as in the case 
of Smith v. Acker, 52 Cal. 217, referred to and approved 
in Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. McCormick et al., 37 
Utah, 150. That it is an ultimate fact and so found there 
can be no question. 'rhe rule is well established in this 
state and in other ;jurisdictions that: 
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"If the Court makes a finding of ultimate 
facts antd additional findings of probative facts 
not shown to be the only probative facts estab-
lished by the evidence, the judgment rendered in 
accordance with the ultimate facts cannot be at-
tacked on the ground that the first findings are not 
true because contradicted by the probative facts.'' 
Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. McCormick, 
supra. 
Standard Ency. of Proc., p. 1061. 
It is perfectly obvious that, for aught the record 
shows, this whole controversy may have been determined 
by a warranty deed from the Utah Copper Company and 
Earl to Stephen Hays, by which these very ores and min-
erals in express terms were conveyed to Hays; or there 
may have been a release or quit claim from the same 
parties as part of the same transaction as the transfer 
fromllays to Earl. It is suflieieut to say that the record 
is silent and the presumption is with the Court's findings. 
See Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. McCor-
miek, supra. 
Assignments of error Nos. 2 to 14 are all based upon 
the premise that finding No. 11 is unsupported. If finding 
No. 11 stands, then, of course, the assignments of error 
n~ferred to are unfoundC::~d since these findings complain 
of the conclusions of law as not based on any findings ot 
fact. Even if finding No. 1l v1ere not a finding· of an 
ultimate fact,-still the other findings in the r0cord with 
respect to the intention of the parties at the very tinw the 
deed was made, which intention for aught the record 
shows to the contrary may have been established by com-
petent written evidence made at the very time,-abund-
antly supports the conclusions of law. 
The assignments of error from 15 to 27, inclusive, all 
deal with the insufficiency of the evidence. It is a com-
plete ans\ver to ead1 of these assignments to say that 
there is no bill of exceptions and the evid,ence is not be-
fore the Court. 
As to assignments of error 28 and 29, the assign-
ments are simply that the Court erred in rendering a 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. 
Assignments 30 to 33, inclusive, complain of the in-
sufficiency of the evidence. 
All these assignments of error, Nos. 15 to 33, inclu-
sive, complain of the oveTruling of the motion for new 
trial. B1tt the motion for new trinl is not made part 
of the record by bill of exception and ca;nnot be consid-
ered by this cmLrt on appeal. ·while the order overrul-
ing the motion for new trial is part of the judgment roll, 
the motion itself is not unless so made by bill of excep-
tion. 
Imnuance Agency v. Investment Co., 33 
Utah 542, at 544. 
Moreover,- the assignments of error complain of the 
insufficiency of the evidence; but there is no bill of ex-
ceptions. 
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Assignments 34 to 41, inclusive, in effect complain 
that the Court erred in its findings and decree, because 
the complaint docs not state facts suffi,cient to constitute 
a cause of action. 
It will be seem from the above, that after all, the 
only substantial assignment of error in the record is 
that the complaint does not state a cause of action. Upon 
this question -vve might well submit the case for further 
discussion. 
II. 
In view of the record it seems something of an im-
position upon the Court to diseuss what must necessarily 
be purely academi,c questions. \Vithout any evidence or 
even the opinion of the Court before us as part of the 
record, any statement of fact must necessarily be based 
wholly upon the amended complaint and the findings. The 
answer of the appellant cannot aid tlw appellant nor the 
exhibit which is made a part of its answer. Every alle-
gation in the answer so far as the record shows ( and the 
presumption is with ns) may have been destroyed by the 
evidence adduced. The only facts before the Court are 
the facts admitted by the complaint and the answer of 
Stephen Hays, and the fads as the Court has found 
them. l;Jven the deed does not appear in the record,-its 
legal effect only is pleaded. The deed may have contained 
broad recitals. It may havP also included an express 
waiver of subjacent support. The lease does not appear 
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and the rights only, under such lease, are pleaded. The 
case therefore involves merely an analysis of the com-
plaint and findings, and a discussion of the legal propo-
sitions arising thereunder. 
The Facts as Pleaded and Fo·und. 
The complaint and findings here are consistent and 
in terms very much alike. Since the complaint alleges 
that the defendants denied plaintiff's right to extract ore 
anywhere, from any part of the ground in controversy, 
and threatened plaintiffs with bodily injury, it is hardly 
necessary to discuss the assignments of error which com-
plain that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to 
constitute a cause of action. The complaint pleads the 
legal effe.ct of the deed. The findings add to this by show-
ing the intention of the parties; the method· of mining in 
vogue; that through :surface mining alone could the 
plaintiff derive any benefit or profit from the ore re-
served, and the further fact, expressly found, that by the 
reservation the parties intended to waive subjacent sup-
port. The finding·s set forth the following: 
Stephen Hays and wife owned certain prem1ses m 
Bingham to which they gave~ a quit claim deed to the 
agent of the Utah Copper Company, expressly reserving, 
however, the rig·ht (we give the language of findings No. 
• 
10 
2), "to all ores IN AND UNDERNEATH tlw surface 
area, together with the right to mine and remove the 
same, with the proviso that the mining operations should 
not endanger any buildings or improvements then or 
thereafter erected on the follmu·ing described portion of 
the snrface area so conveyed, by reason af the sinking or 
caving of said surfa,c(~ area caused by such mining opera-
tions, to-wit:" 
(Then follows a description of a small rectangular 
strip, being the property upon which, if buildings were 
erected, they should not be emhngered by caving the sur-
face, this restricted area being thus segregated from the 
whole tract, the mineral rights in which were reserved.) 
At the time of the ·Conv<~yance and for a long time 
prior this property decd<'d was known to contain valuable 
and marketable minerals, particulnrly copper at many 
places A'l1 AND 11\DlEDIAri'ELY UNDERNEATH the 
surface; and mining operations ha<l been carried on by 
employing surface as well as underground methods; and 
by taking out aml running all the material of the surface 
from the surface dovYmvard; and this was the only 
method hy which the mining of ores at or immediately 
underneath the surface could be suc,cessfully or profit-
ably carried on. At the time of the conveyance it was 
the intPntion of the parties that the grantct~ waived any 
right whatso(lver to suhjncent support, <'xcept in the rec-
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tangular strip 236 feet long and 100 feet wide, above re-
ferred to. 
Finding 5, Abs. 58-59. 
After the making of the above deed, for the purposf~ 
of erecting buildings the Utah Copper Company exca-
vated a very great quantity of material containing copper 
of commer·cial value, from the restricted area; piled the 
ore or material there taken in two dumps in other por-
tions of the premises conveyed; cribbed it and used part 
of the ore as a retaining "~Nall, and erected five houses,-
three within the restrieted area, one partially outside and 
one wholly outside. Hays leased to the plaintiffs on a 
twenty per cent royalty of the net value of all ore ex-
tracted upon condition that lessee should not in mining 
endanger any buildings on said premises and would con-
form to conditions of the reservation in the deed, and 
should mine continuously. The lessees prepared to per-
form. 'rhey commenced with the ore piled in dnmps and 
necessarily disturbed the, tCribbing. The Utah Copper 
Company thereupon destroyed their ore chutes and min-
ing appliances and claimed they had no right to remove 
any ore, either from tlw dumps or from any part of the 
premises; and refused to permit the plaintiffs to remove 
any ore from any part of the premises. The ·Utah Cop-
per Company then selected a site (part of the premises 
conveyed but wholly outside the restricted area) where 
there was a large body of ore immediately underneath 
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the surface and built thereon a large and expensive build-
ing. TlH~ 11th finding is that Hays, previous to the mak-
mg of the deed and lease, was and ever since has been 
the O"\VJH'r of all the ores and minerals undereanth the 
surface area of the property conveyed. 
The above are all the faets we can glean from the 
record. \Ve find, however, in the brief of ,counsel for ap-
prlla.nts, such additional statements as the following: 
"If Hays had the right to disturb the surface 
of this ground by quarrying and blasting, etc., to 
get the claimed reserved ore, it is sit,rnificant that 
no provision was inserted in the deed with respect 
to the danger to life and property consequent 
thereon." (Appellant's Brief 19.) 
It is hardily necessary to remind the court that the 
deed is not before the conrt. There may have been that 
very provision in the deed for aught the record shows. 
Again : ''The language of the lease is materially 
different from that of the reservation in the deed from 
Hays to Earl." (Appellant's Brief 53.) Just how ap-
pellant established this fact, unless they refer to their 
own exhibit and assume that it has been proven simply 
because they have pleaded it, we cannot surmise. 
Again: 
"Extrinsic facts and extraneous parol evi-
dence cannot be allowed to vary the meaning of 
the language of that deed or lease." (Appellant's 
Brief, page 55.) 
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Why counsel assume that these findings were made 
on extrinsic pa,rol evidence, in the absence of a bill of 
exceptions, we cannot imagine. 
So that the case is stripped to the findings, and the 
question is simply one of law. 
QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED. 
We must assume in this discussion that the facts as 
found rest upon competent testimony. It does not mat-
ter therefore whether the testimony be in the nature of a 
recital in the deed, or otherwise appear. We have the 
right to rest upon the presumption that the facts as 
found were properly found and upon competent testi-
bony. 
With these findings, therefore, before the court, the 
question of law for discussion may be reduced to the one 
proposition: Parties to a deed have in mind certain 
valuable ore bodies which exist at and immediately under-
neath the surface, which ore bodies are to be retained 
and reserved to the grantor. They know and have in 
contemplation the fact that the only and possible way 
such ore can be of any use or be profitably or economically 
mined is by taking out and removing aU the material in 
the surface from the surface downward, and that this 
method was not only the sole feasible method, but was 
the usual and common practice in mining. With thet"P 
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facts in contemplation they prepared a deed intending 
thereby to reserve to the grantor the profit and advan-
tage from mining this ore and intending by their lan-
guage to waive on behalf of the grantee any right what-
soever to subjacent support, excepting within a small 
inner and restricted area on which buildings might be 
erected. With this their intention and all these facts 
before they, they express the reservation and their inten-
tion in the following language: 
''Said grantors expressly reserve to them-
selves, their heirs and assigns the right to all the 
ore IN and UNDERNEATH THE SURFACE AREA of the 
property so conveyed together with the right to 
mine and remove the same ; providing that such 
mining operations shall not endanger any build-
ing erected within the following restricted strip of 
the property deeded. (The restricted strip upon 
which buildings are to be erected is described by 
metes and bounds.) '' 
In the language used, with the purpose and intent 
of the parties, and of surrounding circumstances before 
the court, to be construed, so that it will accomplish the 
purpose designed, or is the grantor to be deprived of 
the advantage contemplated and the intention of the par-
ties defeated 7 
From the above certain conclusions are inevitable. 
(a) Hays intended to reserve the minerals. 
(b) Unless subjacent support were waived (while 
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the very essence of the transaction included the reserva-
tion), it became utterly valueless, and the reservation 
meaningless. 
(c) He was willing, however, to give and did give 
to the grantee subjacent support for a certain specified 
area. 
(d) By some competent evidence it was made to 
appear (whether by recitals in the deed or otherwise is 
immaterial) that the parties actually intended by the 
transaction to waive the right of subjacent support. 
To contend under the above state of the record that 
the reservation is ''as broad as the grant and therefore 
void" is absurd. The Utah Copper Company got just 
what it bargained for. It had obtained, sacred for its 
building purposes, the restricted area in which we were 
so far prohibited from mining, that we could not en-
danger the buildings then or thereafter erected thereon. 
It received also surface rights wherever there was not 
mineral which would pay to extract; and it got also sur-
face rights when and where Hays did not mine. It now 
wants more. It denies Hays any mineral rights what-
ever; takes his ore, puts it in dumps and now claims the 
ore because (forsooth!) by extracting, it has made it part 
of the surface! And this, too, all contrary to the express 
intention of the parties! And in direct violation of their 
moral obligation and solemn agreement. 
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As said by the court in Gordon v. Delaware, 97 Atl. 
1032: 
"That such reservation is not as broad as the 
grant is self-evident. It is familiar knowledge that 
the right of surface support can be waived by an 
implied as well as an express consent; and it is 
so implied by the acceptance of a grant offered 
upon terms unmistakably intended to extinguish 
the right." 
Appellants argue in effect: 
"The estate passed to Earl was the fee; if 
a fee he might build or do with it as he pleased, the 
plaintiff therefore had no right to work any sur-
face material. The defendants therefore have the 
right of subjacent support." 
All of which is a beautiful example of reasoning in 
a circle. At the outset the deed did not pass the title in 
fee. 
Adams v. Reed, 11 Utah 480, 168 U. S. 573. 
Moreover, the deed in express terms reserved the 
right to all ore-not only underneath but also all ore in 
the surface. Not only this, but the right to subjacent sup-
port is clearly restricted to the restricted area. For 
the deed reserved to the grantor the right to all ores 
in the surface and to remove the same, provided such 
mining operations did not endanger buildings and im-
provements, but only when erected within the restricted 
area. In other words, his operations may endanger all 
buildings and improvements outside the restricted area. 
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Counsel contend that the words "in the surface" 
are to be construed as reading ''ores in the area herein-
before described and underneath the surface," but to 
the contrary both the words "in" and also "~tnder­
neath" are found in the sentence. Counsel's language 
is not found in the deed, but must be implied to secure 
their construction. vV e must transpose--eliminate. The 
deed reads "or in" and also "underneath" the surface. 
It is too clear for argument that the words used must 
be construed in a sense other than their plain meaning 
if appellants' construction prevails. rro say under such 
circumstances that we cannot place the court in the situa-
tion of the parties-show their view point at the time of 
making the agreement, is to state an absurdity. 
"In construing private conveyances it is ap-
parent that each case must be decided upon the 
language of the grant or reservation, the surround-
ing circumstances and the intention of the grantor, 
if it can be ascertained.'' 
1 Lindley on Mines, 3d Ed., Sec. 93, p. 153. 
"The only thing, tlwrefore, that tlll' courts 
are concernt>d ·with is to ascertain the intentim.: of 
the parties to any contract, and, when this is as-
certained, the duty to enforce such intention, ad-
mits of no escape. A primary canon of construc-
tion is to construe the language of the parties 
when applied to the subject matter of the con-
tract. The langauge usf•d -vvlH•n applied to the 
subject matter must be> given its usnal and ordi-
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nary meaning, unless it is clear that certain words 
or terms arc employed in a technical sense. If the 
intention of the parties cannot readily be ascer-
tained from the language alone, then the court 
must have recourse to the situation, conditions 
and circumstances which affected the parties, and 
from the language when considered in the light 
that those matters afford, determine the real inten-
tion of the parties." 
Daly v. Old, 35 Utah 74, at page 82. 
'' FJvidcnce as to the condition, situation and 
adaptation of land for a particular use, tlw declar-
ation of the parties as to the use to ·which the land 
was to be put, and that it had no rental valne for 
any other purpose, is aclmissihle, to show the in-
tent of the parties in the use of the phrase 'reason-
able~ use.' " 
"\Vhcn the mcanin1.~ in an expression in a writ-
ten contrad is doubtful, it is proper to place the 
facts in view of the parties ·when making the ,con-
tract bc> fore the Court, wh0n construing it." 
Bartels v. Brain, 13 Utah 162. 
It is quite true that when the estate in minerals IS 
sev<~red from the soil, the ovvner of the latter estate has 
the right of subjacent support for the surface. But this 
right may he waived either expressly or by implication. 
'' T f apt \Vords arc used, whether in the instru-
ment of severance itself, or in a contemporaneous 
or a subsequent instrument, and whether in affirm-
ntiv<' or negative terms, and whether in express 
terms, or by plain implication, and whether the 
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underlying mines are granted or excepted, and 
whether the instrument is voluntary or statutory 
the right of support for land in its natural state 
may be effectually excluded.'' 
Paul v. Island Coal Co., 88 N. E. 959. 
''The right to surface support may be con-
troUecl by ,contract, however, as where the right to 
support is excepted from the grant or reservation 
by apt words.'' 
27 Cyc. at page 790. 
"In determining what is included in a grant or 
reservation of mineral or mineral rights, the gen-
eral rules of construction apply; and the old tech-
nical distinction between the reservations and ex-
ceptions seems to be disregarded to a great ex-
tent, the object of the courts being to arrive at and 
enforce the intention of the parties.'' 
27 Cyc. 685. 
Even from the language of the reservation, it is per-
fectly clear that the only surbce support intend,ed was 
support for the ground embraced within the restricted 
area. The parties contemplated that the snrface should 
he sunk or caved outside of this area. The fact that the 
grantor was not to sink or cave the surface of the re-
stricted area, clearly indicates that the parties had in 
mind that all outside of such area might or would be 
'caved in the process of mining. Counsel seems to con-
tend that presnmptially the words "mining operations" 
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imply an excavation in the earth,-subterranean works 
of some kind. Such is not the meaning of the term as 
construed by this Court. 
was 
''From an examination of a large number of 
cases we are convinced that the foregoing is a 
fair deduction of law upon the subject as declared 
by the modern decisions, both of England and this 
country. From the foregoing, it thus seems clear 
to us that where we find the terms "mines and min-
erals" used in grants or in reservations, in instru-
ments of conveyance, in statutes or eonstitutions, 
under the modern construction, the former is not 
limited to mere subterranean exacavations or work-
ings, nor is the latter limited to the metals or 
metalliferous deposits, whether contained in veins 
that have well-defined walls or in beds or deposits 
that are irregular and are found at or near the sur-
face or otherwise.'' 
Nephi PlastPr Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah 
114. 
In Hext v. Gill, L. R. (7 Cha. App. 699) the languag·e 
''Reservation was all mines and minerals with-
in and under the premises with full liberty to dig, 
search for, take and work the said excepted mines 
and minerals.'' 
Held, that a bed of decomposed granite constituted 
minerals and was within the meaning of the reservation 
and the grantor was permitted to remove the bed by open 
quarrying. This method of mining, of course, destroyed 
the surface in that part vYhere the mineral was located, 
~1 
yet it was held that the right to surfa,ce support had been 
waived. 
In Earl of Rosse v. Wainman, (14 :Messon & ~Welsby, 
859; 2 Exch. 800) 10 Morrison Mining Reports, 398, tlw 
reservation was of "all mines and minerals," with the 
right to dig, sink, search for and work said mines and min-
erals, provided that the grantors in searching for and 
working the said mines and minerals should keep the first 
layer or stratum of earth separate and apart by itself 
without mixing the same with the lower strata. The grant 
w.as in th(~ form of an enclosure act taking certain waste 
lands away from the lord and alloting thrm to common-
ers. A stratum of building stone was found just below 
the surface and under the reservation the surfaee soil was 
removed to a great extent and the stratum of stone taken 
out by quarrying. It was held that this was permissible 
under, and contemplated by, the reservation. 
''The methods of mining pursued (1epend upon 
the location of the deposit, the eharact<~r of the 
mineral, its value, the natm·p of the rock in whidt 
it is embedded, and the extent and position of the 
deposit. ~When tlw mineral is exposP<l at the sur-
face, or is covere<l only hy a shallow layer of soil, 
quarrying iR rC'sorted to.'' 
Bnrdiek v. Dillon, 144 Fed. 7:37, at p. 7::m. 
In N. Pa<:>. R. R. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U. S., p. 5:10, 
tlw Court says: 
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"Nor do we approximate much more closely 
to the meaning of the word by treating minerals as 
substances which are 'mined,' as distinguished 
from those which are 'quarried,' since many valu-
able deposits of gold, copper, iron and coal lie 
upon or near the surface of the earth, and some of 
the most valuable building stone, such, for instance, 
as the Caen stone in France, is excavated from 
mines running far beneath the surface. The dis-
tinction between underground mines and open 
workings was expressly repudia,ted in Midland 
Ry. Co. v. Haunchwood Co., L. R. 20 Ch. Div. 552, 
and in Hext v. Gill, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 699." 
In Graff v. Scranton Coal Co., Pa., 91 Atl. p. 508, the 
reservation excepted and reserved all the coal and min-
erals beneath the surface" with the sole right to mine and 
remove the same by any subterranean process incident 
to the business of mining--without thereby incurring in 
any event whatever any liability for injury caused or 
damage done to the surface of said lot or to the build-
ings or improvements which now or hereafter may be put 
thereon." Then followed a discharge from any liability 
for any injury that may result to the surface of said 
prem1ses. 
In Kellert v. Rochester etc. Co., Pa., 74 Atl. 789, the 
words used are as follows: 
''And the parties of the first part do hereby 
release all and every daim or claims for damages 
to the said land caused by operating or workings 
of said mines, in a proper manner." 
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UndPr such conveyanf:e it was held that the right to 
surface support had been waived and that all the coal 
could bP mined, whether the surface caved or not. 1n the 
case at bar the grantor reserved ''all ores in and under-
neath th<~ ~;ur[aee nr<>a, together with the right to mine and 
remove tht> same, provided said mining operations shall 
not endanger any buildings or improvements now or here-
after erected on a portion of the surface are hereinabove 
described hy reason of the sinking or ,caving· of the sur-
face of said area caused by said mining operations." If 
all of the ore in the surface area and undenwath tlw sur-
face area was reserved to the grantor and if it is neces-
sary to take out that in tlw surface by surface mining 
or quarrying and the grantor should he rPfus<~d this 
method, and be compelled to give surfaee support to all 
outside the n~strietod area, then the resPrvatiou it' of lit-
tle value and meaning. 
In Griffing v. Fairmont Coal Co., \V. Va., 2nd L. R. 
A. (N. S.) it is held: 
"vVhere a deed conveys the coal under a tract 
of laud togdher with the right to enter upon and 
under said land, awl to mim~, ex,cavate, and re-
move all of it, thf~re is no implied reservation in 
such an instrument that the grante<~ must leave 
enough coal to support the surface in its original 
position.'' 
This case reviews many of the authorities and is a 
leadina: cnsc on the qnestion here involved. 'Vhile it has 
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been criticised by some cases, such as Piedmont etc. Co. v. 
Kearney, Md., 79 At. 1913, Collins v. Gleason Coal Co., 
Iowa, 115 N. vV. 497, Stone Gap Colliery Co. v. Hamlin, 
89 S. FJ. 305, vV elch v. Kansas Fuel Co., Kan., 137 Pac. 
941, still it can easily be distinguished. from those cases 
and the reasoning in the •case is no doubt sound. The 
preceding four cases and the cases of Griffin v. Fairmont 
Coal Co., supra, exhaustively discuss the authorities of 
subjacent support. In Coon v. Fairmont Coal Co., 179 
Fed. 191, the Federal Court follows the decision of the 
state court on the theory that it is a rule of property and 
should be followed, and says, at page 210: 
"We are not unmindful of the fact that the 
decision of the courts of England and many of the 
courts of this country are not in harmony with the 
decision of the court in vV est Virginia. N everthe-
less, we find ourselves impelled to the conclusion 
that this differenc(~ is on account of the peculiar 
facts involved in this case, and not because of the 
proposition of law announced by the courts to 
which we refer.'' 
See also Madden v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 
61 At. 559; 
Scranton v. Phillips, 94 Pa. St. 15. 
As heretofore suggested we refuse to be drawn into 
a discussion of the deli-cate distinctions which have been 
made and the criticism which has arisen concerning the 
Griffin case (supra). It may well be that the note to 41 
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L. R. A. (N. S.) is sound. Standing alone, with the actual 
intent not disclosed, particularly in states w hc~re the old 
rule as to the meaning of "mines and minerals" obtains 
the Griffin case may be wrong,-or right. It does not 
affect the result here. ~Ve think, perhaps, the rule ought 
to be as stated in Brady v. Smith 181 N.Y. 178; 7:) N. 
E. 9G3, which appellant thinks is "a case mnch in point." 
(App. Brief 15.) There the words W<~re: 
"All mines and minerals which 1nay be frmnd 
on the above piece of ground.'' 
The Court says: 
"It appears in the fhzdinr;s that immense 
boulders and ledges of limestone crop ont on the 
surface of these premises; and it ·would be a 
strained and unnatural construction to assume that 
the language commented upon above r·efers to stone 
lying open to view. * * '~ It is thus apparent 
that each case must be decided u-pon the lan[Jttage 
of the grant, the surroundin~q circ1tmstances and 
the intention of the grantor if it can be ascer-
tained.'' 
Here, there can he no question as to thf~ ore referrPd 
to: the surrounding circumstances arP shown; and thP 
intention of the parties is clearly made to appear. 
In this case. there is an express finding that the 
patries intended to waive subjacent snpport. The trial 
cmtrt had the deed before ·it and this appellate court can 
only guess at its contents. ALL oF TH1~ ci-rcumstances 
were before the trial court showing the attitude of the 
parties. In finding this intention it was the duty of the 
trial court (presumably performed) to take,-not merely 
the dry words used,-not merely the language of the 
reservation, but to compare every part of the enlire in-
strument so that while endeavoring to give every sub-
stantive part operative effect, also to give it a practical 
rather than a theoretical application. The constrUtCtion 
should be upon a view of the attitude of the parties mak-
ing it. How, with the deed absent from the record, with 
the only basis the finding itself may this court assume that 
the evidence· from the entire deed does not justify this 
finding? It is no answer to say that the instrument was 
a deed, nor that it was a quit-claim deed. It was in many 
respects not a usual or stereotyped instrument, but one 
prepared in view of the peculiar conditions. 
Considering the findings and the absence of any bill 
of exceptions, the language of the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals of this circuit is peculiarly applicable. 
"Plaintiff's counsel have displayed marked 
research into the nice distinctions respecting the 
creation of qualified estates, and rest the case 
laregly upon the rigidity of some tenchinacl rules 
of construction touching such deeds to real prop-
erty. \V e will not undertake to review all the au-
thorities cited, as the discussion would be more 
academic than useful. There is in the interpreta-
tion and construction of written instruments no 
more marked t~ndency of the judicial mind than 
to get at directly what was the real thought and 
purpose of the maker of the instrument. \Vlwn 
the language and terms employed arc explicit, or 
have a gt>nerally a,cceptcd meauing, or, as appli,~d to 
the subject matter, have acquired a tee]mienl ap-
plication, the letter of tlw written instrmneut must 
control. But when the language is ambiguous or 
vague, or the terms employed erPate n~1wmwhle 
uncertainties as to what \VUS the actual intent of 
the grantor, no safer rule can obtain than to place 
ourselves, as near as may he, in the precise situa-
tion of th0 person at the time of the execution of 
the instrunH:•nt, arHl read and apply every part of it 
as a whole, and thus dis,coverin,'r, \dlat the real mind 
of the party was, to follow that to ib praetieal eon-
elusion. The Court tbat uoes this will SPldom go 
~wrong, and will measurably avoid the offens(~ of 
making and enforcing eontraets rww•r assented to 
by tht• partie's signing th0m. This thought is aptly 
expressed in ~Walsh v. Hill, 38 Calif. 481: 
" 'In the construction of written instruments 
we have never derived much aid from the technical 
rules of the books. The only rule of much value 
-one which is frequently shadowed forth, but 
i:ieldom, if ever, expressly stated in tbc hooks-is 
to place ourselves as nearly as possible in the 
seats whieh were oecupied by the parties at the 
time the instrument was executed; then, by taking 
it by its four eorncrs, read it.' 
"It may be regarded as the recognized rule> 
that in the exposition of grants and contracts tlte 
eonstruction should be upon the view of the atti-
tude of the person making them, and ?qJOn a com-
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parison of every part of the entire instru-ment, so 
that, while endeavoring to give every substantive 
pa.rt operative effect, also to gtive it a practical 
rather than a theoretical application. Devl. 
Deeds, 837, 855; vV olfe v. Dyer, 95 Mo. 545, 8 
S. W. 551; Jackson v. Myers, 3 Johns 387. And 
when the intention is apparent, without repug-
nance to the settled rules of law, it will control 
the technical terms; 'for the intention, and not 
the words, is the sense of any agreement.' And 
this will prevail 'regardless of inapt expressions 
or carless recitation.' Collins v. Lavelle, 44 
Vt. 233; Carson v. McCaslin, 60 Ind. 337; Rocke-
feller v. Merritt, 40 U. S. App. 666, 22 C. C. A. 
608, 76 Fed. 909, 913; In re Bomino 's Estate, 83 
Mo. 433, 441." 
Speed v. St. Louis M. B. T. R. Co., 86 Fed. 
235, 237. 
III. 
But on what theory can the defendants, as a matter 
of good law or good morals, claim the ore which was 
placed in the dumps~ This ore, by the express terms of 
the reservation, belonged to the grantor. If any build-
ings erected in the restricted area were endangered by 
its removal, of course this practical difficulty would pre-
vent its removal. But this is only if and while required 
to remain for support. The defendant, however, having 
removed it, and the necessity for its use as surface sup-
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port having ceased, the defendants now claim the ore as 
ore and a right in addition to the support of this ore, 
beca,use the ore is placed on the ,~urface. In other words, 
they created a new surface and seek to hold the new sur-
face sacred and the ground beneath it. Under the same 
theory the defendants might take every pound of ore that 
is in or underneath the surface, though the same extended 
to the very center of the earth, heap it mountain high, 
and then claim an equal distance below surface as sup-
port for it. 
The language of the reservation under the f1ndings is 
clean-cut-the grantors are entitled to all ores in and 
underneath the surface of all the property so conveyed. 
They are entitled to the right to mine and remove the 
same; but such mining operatitns must not endanger any 
building or buildings then or thereafter erected on the 
restricted area. The removal of this ore docs not en-
danger any building, it had been dug out long before, and 
its removal would not in any sense jeopardize any of the 
buildings. 
Counsel say (App. Brief 23): "How did appPl-
lant 's leveling off the ground and depositing thP matl'rial 
elsewhere pass any title to the material to the respond-
ents 1 '' The title passed to Hays' lessee by the reserva-
t,ion. "\Vhen did the appellant secure title to this ma-
terial~ If all of the surface could be removed without 
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endangering the buildings on the restricted area, every 
pound of ore (and, by ore we mean material containing 
mineral of marketable value), belonger to the plaintiffs 
in this case. The deed did not contemplate and was not 
intended to give to the defendants any mineral rights. 
All of their rights are subject to the reservation that the 
grantor has the right to take the ore which may be in 
the surface, and also the ore underneath the surface 
throughout the entire deeded area, except to the extent 
that buildings may be endangered by the removal of the 
surface wtihin a certain restricted area. 
IV. 
Counsel complain that we injured the cribbing. If 
A steals the property of B and puts a fence around it, 
ean he complain because B in the retaking injures the 
fence~ The injury to the cribbing involved no act other 
than such as by the contract of the parties Hays was per-
mitted to do. If he had (outside the restricted area) the 
right to cave the surface-then the defendant took its 
own chances in building where such caving would cause 
it injury. The baldest, most deliberate and most lawless 
act eharacterizing the defense in this case was the 
erection by the defendant of a large, expensive house 
outside the restricted area directly over a large and val-
uable ore body. And this work was done while the liti-
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gation was in progress and while the parties were (pre-
sumably) determining their rights in the courts. 




SHIRLEY P. JONES, 
Attorneys for F. L. Byron, Charles S. Austin, Re-
spondents. 
B0011 H, LEE, BADGER & RICH, 
Attorneys for Steven Hays, Impleaded Defendant 
and Respondent. 
